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ABSTRACT 
Comparative analysis of not only criminal justice ad­
ministration, but also efforts to modify the existing legal 
systems are informative to the extent that they allow readers 
to broaden their perspectives and to learn lessons from other 
countries. This paper seeks to elaborate on this statement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Who would suspect that Alaska, the 49th state in the United States, 
and the new states of Africa South of the Sahara
1 
have anything in comrron? 
At first glance, prospects of any comron denominators appear unusually 
remote. Topographical variations, for example, are great. 
The thick, damp jungles, extended desert land, and open dry 
velds served as popular stereotypes of Africa in general and 
the new states of Africa south of the Sahara in particular. 
On the other hand, Alaska has been known as the territory of 
ice, igloos and Eskimos. 
The antithesis of the two places in the world appears to 
go even further in relation to their resources. Alaska now 
is beaming with the new wealth derived from oil, whereas 
many of the new· states of Africa south of the Sahara are 
faced with perennial problems of poverty, unemployment, in­
flation and high cost of energy. 
But before students of criminal justice in Alaska and 
the new states of Africa South of the Sahara conclude that 
there is a basic incompatibility between the two places, 
they should look more closely. For there are likely to be 
some surprises. What on first glance appear to be grave 
fundamental differences in social institutions and traditions 
turn out to be common denominators in certain respects. For 
example, scattered and scarce records of early colonial Alaska 
and Africa SJuth of the Sahara make analysis of their history 
difficult and in some instances impossible. Many questions, 
such as how and where the inhabitants in each place lived and 
why, cannot be answered adequately. For another thing, the 
story of Alaska and those of the new states of Africa South of 
the Sahara must be told in several simultaneous and interacting 
versions. For one thing, it is the story of other nations. In 
the case of Alaska, this entails events in Russia, Britain and 
the United States which attracted these countries to the fur 
resources of Alaska; and that of the new states of Africa South 
of the Sahara entails events in European countries such as 
England, France, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Holland and Germany 
and the United States.
2
This paper is an attempt to elaborate on the above and 
related common denominators by focusing on one common denominator, 
namely the resilience of or the extent to which Native, customary 
or indigenous laws in Alaska and the new states of Africa 
South of the Sahara have been reduced to the status of living 
law as enunciated by Eugene Ehrlich.3 That is to say, accord-
ing to Ehrlich's observation of the peasants' behavior, the 
common laws (or "unofficial ones" or informal controls) fol-
lowed differed from the official ones, that is formal control. 
In this way, Ehrlich introduced a second path for legal thought 
that regards law as the principles abstracted from the actual 
behavior of members of the society.
4
. This kind of "living law"
he constructed with "norms for decisions"--actually abstracts � 
from actual court decisions
5
--and "legal propositions" 
(statutes). The latter he regarded as the basic principles 
abstracted from the norms for decisions, "couched in words, 
proclaimed authoritatively with a claim to universal validity.116
Thus, to Ehrlich the "living law" was the "law which dominates 
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life itself even though it has not been posited in legal 
propositions. II 
7 
Over and over again he stressed the behavioral
attributes of his living law: "The living law is not the part 
of the content of the document that the courts recognize as 
binding when they decide a legal controversy, but only that 
part which the parties actually observe in life. 11
8 
He suggested
that to acquire the knowledge of this law one should study its 
provisions quite independently of the question whether they 
have already found expression in a judicial decision or in a 
statute or whether they will ever find it.
9 
In short, Ehrlich
aims to "describe methodologically and objectively, by a 
method apart from all technique, the integral and spontaneous 
reality of law in all levels of profundity.11
10
Since law, whether legislated (state law) or not (the 
living law) does not exist in a vacuum, it means that this 
paper will also deal with socio-cultural, economic, political 
and historical aspects of the societies in the two places. 
Within this framework, the paper seeks to explore and analyze 
the theoretical underpinnings of the imposition of law, the 
interaction between state law and the living law, and criminal 
justice reform within the broader sphere of social control. 
PRECOLONIAL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRADITIONS 
Prior to Alaska's coming under the influences of Russia, 
Britain and the United States, there existed Native laws 
unique to each community; so was it true of Africa South of 
the Sahara before European colonization. In either place, the 
legal institutions and traditions reflected various forms of 
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social organizations. The Tlingit Indians of Alaska, for 
example, were organized into heredity clans, and according to 
Kalervo Oberg, the only punishable offenses within each clan 
were incest and witchcraft.
11 Many inter-clan offenses per­
taining to life, property or honor were settled by payment of 
goods from one clan to another: 
Murder was generally punished by death - a man of 
equal rank being selected from the murderer's clan. 
In case the murderer was of much higher rank than 
the man murdered, his clan would offer restitution 
by a payment of goods. This would also be true if 
there were slight differences of rank between the 
murdered man and the man selected to pay for his 
loss. Equality was demanded and differences were 
always made up by payment of goods. 12 
In the case of Africa South of the Sahara, Green notes 
how the guilty one of two litigants among the Igbos of Nigeria 
was asked to take palm wine and oil beans to the other woman 
"so that they might eat together and thus make peace.11
1 3 
Or,
according to some authorities, in the past it was Somali custom 
for the tribe of a person who killed a member of another tribe 
to turn over the culprit to the latter. This was eventually 
replaced by the payment of blood money (dia) as the price 
payable in lieu of the life of the offender.
14 
Thus, in both situations the mode of social interaction 
traditional administration of justice was close to that of 
everyday life. People did not change clothes to go to attend 
in 
a hearing, or engage in ritualistic self-preservation, and they 
used ordinary language to convey the facts, values and arguments 
of the case. 
It must be noted here that in precolonial Alaska and non­
-4-
kingdom societies in Africa South of the Sahara there were no 
police forces nor facilities for incarceration. Only kingdoms 
in Africa South of the Sahara had rudiments of special 
functionaries in law enforcement--they had temporary detention 
facilities. For example, in the kingdom of Ankole (Uganda) a 
kind of stocks, reminiscent of medieval ages, was used on rare 
occasions to detain offenders, usually pending execution. An 
escaped suspect might be brought back from some distant place, and 
tied with-a rope, but even that was considered to be too degrading 
to the accused. Stocks were also used in Buganda (Uganda) , but 
prisons were introduced only after the advent of British rule, 
d ·t 1 f h" h t · th · 
15
espi e an ear y re erence w ic sugges s·o erwise. 
In the eyes of the newcomer, however, the administration 
of justice as outlined above was looked upon with contempt. 
This is illustrated by Sir-William MacGregor on his tour of 
the hinterland of Yorubaland in West Africa in March, 1903, 
when he said: 
The Bale's (ruler's) Council is also the Supreme 
Court of Justice for the town and province. There 
is not a single enlightened man, not a man of the 
new school, in the Council if there is one in Ibadan 
• . •  Justice, it is to be feared, is too often sold
to the highest bidder in cases that come before the
native tribunals.16 
Thus, the bale and members of his council were described 
as "utterly ignorant, " and it was apparently no small concern 
of his that "cases of a judicial nature [which] begin to arise 
daily between European and Natives" were being brought before 
them. Indeed, European traders in Ibadan were complaining that 
they had to appear before the bale's court, resenting the very 
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idea of Europeans ''being judged in the purely native court. "
17
Be that as it may, the precolonial administration of 
justice in Alaska and Africa South of the Sahara contained a 
number of desirable administrative elements for contemporary 
criminal justice reforms. For example, there was the "sense 
that knowledge of the legal subculture, explicitly and implicitly, 
is widely shared, as is appropriate in a system in which the 
litigant must be his own advocate.18 Another sense was that
language of the law is mostly everyday language, which facil­
itated communication between law-appliers and the litigants, 
or between law-appliers and the lay public. 
Second, there was an element of accessibility in the 
sense that the machinery for its application is readily avail­
able to all; it was cheap--e.g., fees amounted to a few shillings 
in Uganda. It is only in the kingdoms in Africa South of the 
Sahara that, by virtue of the hierarchy of the courts, having 
to pay fees and traveling long distances, for example, that posed 
problems of accessibility.and even then only in limited cases 
involving appeals and those of greatest threat to the territorial 
social order. 
Third, there was the element of public participation that 
was promoted by the other two elements, among others. It was 
demonstrated in detection of or ferreting out illegality, 
bringing actions in court, and in the administration of sanctions. 
In all these respects, it involved volunteering of services, to 
a greater or lesser degree, out of a sense of responsibility, 
support, or urgency for re-equalibration of social relationships 
in a given community. 
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IMPOSITION OF FOREIGN LAW 
Before we outline the nature of foreign law in Alaska and 
Africa South of the Sahara, three clarifications appear to be 
in o�der. First, it is pertinent to observe at the outset 
that although historians of Alaska and the new states of 
Africa South of the Sahara have not paid much attention to 
the importance of European law in the establishment and 
maintenance of colonial rule on the continent, there.�s nothing 
new about the role of law in imperial expansion. In Roman 
times, for instance, law occupied a crucial position in the 
administration of the Roman Empire. As the empire expanded 
"the sphere of application of Roman law grew correspondingly. " 
Between 150 B. C. and 150 A.D.,the metropolitan law of Rome 
exparided considerably to meet the growing needs of the 
empire. In the various parts the indigenous laws were 
never wholly replaced, but the ius gentium, an embodiment 
of Roman legal culture, stretched in all directions to em­
brace non-Roman peopl�s, thereby facilitating their incorpora-
20 
tion within the Roman imperial orbit. 
Second, introduction of foreign spheres of interest in 
Alaska and the new st�tes of Africa South of the Sahara 
involved treaty writing and/or the use 0£ force. Take the 
Alaskan example. The American government negotiated a treaty 
with Russia in 1824. By this instrument it was agreed that 
Russian subjects would not push their activities in trade 
and settlement below the line of the parallel of 54°40', and 
that American citizens should not operate to the north of that 
-7-,
19 
line. It was the treaty of 1825 between Russia and Great 
Britain that defined the boundary of Alaska on the land side, 
as it is today. Russia held the great peninsula west to the 
141st meridian of longitude, and a coast strip 30 miles wide 
extending to latitude 54 °40'. The United States finally 
bought Alaska from Russia in 1867, thereby becoming a full­
fledged imperialist, at least in the eyes of Native Alaskans. 
In the African situation coercion, for example, played a 
crucial role in the conquest and control ·of southern Nigeria 
by the British. Between 1902 and 1906, no less than 
23 "punitive expeditions, " besides numerous small scale 
patrols, were mounted against diverse indigenous communities, 
20 
especially east of the Niger. 
The only new state in Africa South of the Sahara whose 
creation does-not fit the treaty and/or use of force pattern 
· is Liberia. In 1816, the American Co.ionization Society was
founded for the expressed purpose of returning free American
blacks to their "ancestral homeland" in Africa. This private
"repatriation" organization was granted a charter by the
government of the United States, which not only supported the
scheme, but also helped the Society in negotiating with
native African chieftains for land along the coast of what
is now Liberia. Members of the Society included such prominent
Americans as Bushro D. Washington, Henry Clay and John
Randolph.
In 1822 the colony of Liberia was formally established, 
with its capital, Monrovia, named for American President 
James Monroe. The first group of "repatriated" 
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blacks arrived shortly thereafter, and although nearly one­
third of this initial group succumbed to disease within a 
short time, the colony continued to grow. By 1830 the 
Society could boast of having settled over 1,400 blacks in 
Liberia. The majority of these had been "free Negroes," 
but after 1827 an increasing number of American slaves were 
being transported. 
Finally, colonial powers differed in their style of 
administering the new territories and, thus, of administration 
of criminal justice. For example, in Africa South of the 
Sahara the British differed sharply from the other European 
powers. The British employed what has come to be popularly 
known as the doctrine of "indirect rule"--irnplying. that 
rule was administered through the existing indigenous 
institutions. 21 While this is reasonably accurate, British
policy varied in degree, depending upon the level of socio­
political development of the Natives, and the number of white 
settlers in the area. Where the indigenous political and 
judicial organizations bore some relationship to those of the 
colonial power, as in those areas which are now known as 
Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Tanzania, attempts 
were made to make as much use of them as possible. In the 
areas where traditional social organizations seemed unadaptable-­
small scale societies or bands of hunting or pastoral Natives-­
greater external control was established. 
The British reluctance to introduce Western ideas of 
law comprehensively into her African colonies, as in the rest 
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of her colonies, is underlined by the broad recognition of 
indigenous law (Islamic or customary). Under the system of 
indirect rule this was applied by traditional judicial authorities 
where they existed22 or by Native courts created by the colonial 
power, somtimes drawing on traditional authorities, sometimes 
inventing them. 23 The application of indigenous law was
restricted by the "repugnancy" clause24 and the Native courts
in most colonies were subject to appeal to the colonial court 
system. 25 But the real threat to indigenous laws came less
from these restrictions and more from a social environment 
favoring the British legal institutions and traditions over 
the indigenous ones. 26
The other European colonial powers in Africa outh of 
the Sahara, notably the French, believed in the creation in 
these regions of a civilization that was essentially non-
indigenous. Thus, the French developed the doctrine of 
"assimilation." The ultimate object was "to integrate the 
overseas possessions with France, to assimilate the colonial 
people into the body of French political, social and cultural 
h h . d . 1127 t oug t an practice. In this situation, the introduction
of the French law, more specifically the civil law, became
not so much a goal in its own right or an instrument of 
development, but rather a political strategy which allowed 
the French authorities to pursue assimilation without unwelcome 
political consequences. The French colonial law made 
distinctions between French citizens and subjects, and citizen­
ship was obtainable only to those who were in a position to 
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give up their personal status under indigenous or Islamic law 
and to switch into the new personal status under civil law. 
The administrative approaches used in Alaska under Russia 
and subsequently under America appeared to vaccilate 
between indirect rule and direct rule. Thus, during the 
Russian sphere of influence Zagoskin reported in his journal 
the Russian American Fur Company instructions to a certain 
Lukin, manager of the post on the Kuskowim: 
In the four villages nearest to the Khulitna, as 
I have designated, inform my friends and acquaint­
ances that I wish them to be toyons [tribal elders, 
term brought from Siberia; elders from each village 
who were appointed overseers by Russian American 
Fur Company were called toyon] (Michael 1967:332) 
in those villages, and to have honor and fame from 
God and our beloved Commander-in-Chief. I beg you 
to receive them as trusted friends, diligent in 
the interests of the Company, with.their loyal 
relations and close comrades, and to procure medals 
for them, and for them to be loyal subjects of our 
tsar Nicholas Pavlovich. 28
For the Alaskan situation and similar situations in the 
United States, Monroe E. Price and his associates wrote: 
The history of Indian legal structure in the 
United States is a history of ambivalence in 
the attitude.of the dominant government. The 
United States and the states themselves have 
frequently changed their own ideas of what 
the proper relationship should be between the· 
reservations and non-reservation government. 
The pendulum has swung from encouraging tribal 
government to discouraging it, and then to 
encouraging of planning of substantial parcels; 
it has gone from using the reservation as a 
locus to "civilize" Indians to a place where 
farming or sheepherding can occur; and then 
on to economic development and industrial 
growth.29
The extent to which American presence has been in Alaska 
has been accounted for by Ernest Gruening30 who uses 
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expressions such as "the era of total neglect," "the era of 
flagrant neglect," "the era of mild but unenlightened interest, " 
"the era of growing interest, " "war discovers Alaska, " and 
"self-government: the quest for statehood. " 
THE NATURE OF FOREIGN LAW 
Colonial legal institutions and traditions in Alaska, 
as in Africa South of the Sahara, developed along two 
lines. In Alaska under pre-revolutionary Russia and in 
the African colonies under European powers other than 
British, the law was known as civil or continental law. 
The law of Alaska under Britain and the United States, and 
of African colonies under British rule, was known as 
common law. 
Elements of Civil Law and Common Law 
Civil law, with its emphasis upon code law, provides 
little opportunity to the· judiciary to make law. It can 
only interpret the law as found in the extensive codes of 
each nation. In addition, the courts do not follow the 
doctrine of stare decisis (decision based upon precedent) 
for fear of executive or legislative restriction upon their 
actions. 
Common law, or nonlegislative law, is derived from the 
English people. As English courts were formed-early in 
this millenium, the king and the magistrates he appointed 
to hear cases on his behalf based their legal judgments on 
what they believed most Englishmen considered was either 
right or wrong. They recorded these decisions. Other 
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judges became aware of them, and as more judges accepted 
these interpretations, the decisions became law. Judge­
made law would change, however, as customs and beliefs 
changes. 
Legal Institutions 
Among the new legal institutions associated with coloni­
alism in Alaska, as in Africa South of the Sahara, are the 
police, courts, and penal institutions/corrections, introduced 
piecemeal. These institutions tended to be 
introduced following successful experimentation of them 
back in the mother country and depending upon how deeply 
involved the colonial power was in the colony, meaning that 
there were variations in the imposition of legal institutions 
from one territory to another. Be that as it may, the 
colonial powers tended to share at least one denominator, 
namely the motivation to emphasize the prison as an 
institution. The prison was to house those who directly 
challenged the colonial authority or who violated the 
newly established criminal law. In other words, the aim 
was to create the good docile native--a willing source of 
raw material and cheap labor. And if he was not willing? 
One could always rely on the police and the army to do a 
little pacification. The penal institutions attempted to 
strengthen his faith in the status quo. The native was a 
clean slate on which anything could be inscribed. He was 
subjected to a constant barrage of suggestions that Western 
culture was all. France, through her policy of enculturation 
went further than Britain: she wanted to scribble on the 
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slate so that all the black surface would be covered with the 
white chalk of French culture, so the saying goes. 
In their efforts to "cure" criminals, colonial prisons 
therefore resorted to another track towards the end of 
colonialism: the attempt to coerce the prisoner to con-
form to established authority. This became in practice, 
the central approach in most colonial prisons, and 
conformity to authority became the basic criterion for 
the eventual release on parole or aftercare. The resulting 
pattern is what is called "liberal totalitarianism.11 31
"Liberal totalitarianism" is explained in the sense 
that "there are institutions which, at least formally, 
have adopted the liberal goal of rehabilitation, while 
maintaining totalitarian control over the lives of prisoners:• 
Moreover, they have adopted a variety of liberal programs 
(recreational programs, vocational training) which in 
practice often serve to further the totalitarian goal of 
changing prisoners into strict conformists to authority. 
Critical Issues Associated with Foreign Law 
Apart from the problem of introducing. the prison, 
the colonial administrators were faced with numerous other 
problems. Among such problems was lack of personnel, from 
the quantitative as well as qualitative point of view, to 
administer various levels of the prison. There were problems 
of cultural conflict--lack of congruence between Western 
ideas, values, norms, mores, ideologies and beliefs and those 
of the Africans. To this end, European/American notions of "-reasonable 
man, " " beyond a reasonable doubt, " "average man, " "presumption 
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of innocence," "winner takes all," "punishment," "imprisonment" 
and "probation" run counter to those of Africans, namely 
"ceremonial celebration or cleansing, " "compromise, " 
"collective responsibility," "victim compensation, " "fine, " 
"ritual murder, " and "institutionalized self-help. " All these 
and other problems made penal proceedings, like other 
aspects of the administration of justice, more or less dif­
ficult in virtually all the colonies. 
There is, however, another side, the side of the colonial 
power itself. If colonial rule is not to be pure exploitation--
and normally it has not been--it must be justified by its 
success in changing the colonial society in ways in which it 
cannot change itself. If the British, for example, changed Ugandan society 
in such a way that Uganda produced more entrepreneurs or more 
democrats than it had before, that may have ·been some compen-
sation to Ugandans for their loss of freedom� If they had left 
Ugandan society as it was before, then, however good the 
government the British provided may have been, it was still 
felt intolerable. Worst of all is the colonial power which 
attempts change without success. Thus, the British opposed 
tribalism enough to annoy the kingdoms (Buganda in particular 
on the issue of the lost counties) , yet never took rigorous 
enough action to abolish it. 
CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS 
Two clarifications are in order before our analysis of 
the contemporary criminal justice reforms. The one has to 
do with the use of the word "contemporary. " Ordinarily 
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the word "postcolonial" is used in the analysis of the 
criminal justice efforts in the new states of Africa South 
of the Sahara since they achieved such status following the 
departure of the European colonial powers. Since Alaska is 
one of the states in America, the use of the word " post­
colonial" is inappropriate. Therefore we use the word 
"contemporary" in such a way as to include those political 
changes that occurred in Africa South of the Sahara and 
Alaska's status in the United States. 
The other clarification is that in discussing the 
contemporary criminal justice reforms in Alaska and in 
the new states of Africa south of the Sahara, a distinction 
between innovations and failures must be made. The sections 
that follow are intended to elaborate on this statement. 
Illustrations of Innovations 
In seeking to illustrate various innovations which 
occurred, it is necessary to first understand what is 
meant by the term "innovation" within its context of 
criminal justice in Alaska and Africa south of the Sahara. 
In this case, it is difficult to use the term in a consis­
tent manner. It is not always possible to make words 
mean what we want them to mean. To this end, there are 
criminal justice ideas or practices which are "new" in the 
sense that they have not been previously known. These are 
rare. Most criminal justice ideas have existed in one form 
or another for thousands of years, even though new terms are 
used in their applications to new situations. Second, 
there are adaptations or modifications of earlier ideas 
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which affect current practices. These are probably the most 
common forms of innovation. Third, there are revivals of 
former practices, which may occur for a number of reasons. 
This may occur as a result of a changed posture on the part of 
policy makers and administrators, or there may be a renewed 
emphasis on objectives to which these practices relate. In 
another case there may be changed conditions which give 
promise that ideas which were previously unsuccessful may now 
succeed. Finally, some things may be viewed as "new" simply 
because the individuals involved have never heard of them, 
understood them, or seen their importance. In light of all 
this, let us now look at three of the changes and innovations 
which took place in both Alaska and the new states of Africa 
south of the Sahara. 
1. The Alaska Example
The 1960's and 1970's have been years of comprehensive 
criminal justice in the United States in general and in 
Alaska in particular. In the first case, several national as 
well as state study commissions were appointed to investigate 
the crime problem-�adult crime and juvenile delinquency--
and the functioning of the police, courts, and corrections 
followinq the successful work of the commission President 
Johnson empaneled in 1965.
32 
In the case of criminal justice
innovations in Alaska, what is contained in the excerpt 
below is indicative of some ambitious plans: 
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In 19 78 the State of Alaska committed itself to 
the development of a comprehensive master plan for 
its corrections system. . Although this plan 
cannot, and does not purport to, provide ultimate 
solutions to corrections problems, it does constitute 
a framework for action in its statement of goals and 
policy alternatives. 33 
2. The Somalia Example
The Republics of Somalia and Tanzania provide perhaps the 
best examples in Africa South of the Sahara of a real start in integrated 
criminal justice in general and integrated approaches to the treatment of 
offenders in particular. In the case of Somalia, shortly after it achieved 
independence, a special commission was appointed to prepare 
uniform criminal legislation. At one of its meetings the 
commission agreed to use the various existing legal systems 
as the basis for new criminal legislation. Those basic legal 
systems, modified to suit the Somalia situation, became the 
law currently in force in the Republic. 
It must be emphasized, however, that the new Somali Penal 
Code's uniqueness and richness lies in inclusion of a considerable 
number of viable elements derived from customary law/Islamic 
law. 
Another unique feature in the creation of the new Somali 
Penal Code is the diverse background of the members of the 
. . 
h' d 
. .  34 
commission. To t is en , Contini wrote: 
The experience in Somalia of integrating two Western 
legal systems and customary law has taught us that 
the work can most effectively be done by teams of 
lawyers trained in different legal systems. In the 
beginning, there was common ground between the 
lawyers with British training and their Italian 
colleagues on only one point; both sides were con­
vinced of superiority of their own systems. However, 
the constant exchange of ideas and experiences 
gradually broadened everyone's vision. In the end, 
mutual suspicions gave way to fruitful collaboration. 
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These scholarly excursions embracing theoretical concerns 
over the subject matter or scope of the work of the commission 
seem to have demonstrated theoretical concerns that were ex­
pounded by Ehrlich, as noted earlier. 
3. Tanzanian Experiment with Cell Justice
Until World War I, Tanganyika (as the mainland portion of 
Tanzania used to be called) was a German colony. Following 
World War II, Tanganyika became a British colony under the 
terms of a League of Nations Trusteeship. Independence was 
received in 1961. In 1964, Tanganyika absorbed the formerly in­
dependent islands of Pemba and Zanzibar, after an uprising in 
which blacks of Zanzibar massacred the Arab population in those 
islands, and acquired its present name. 
As a means of experimentation and, hopefully, of improving 
the local administrative-political structure, Tanzania intro­
duced the so called cell system into its governmental structure 
in 1965. A cell is designated as a group of approximately 10 
houses, grouped together as a basic organizational cell unit. 
Each cell is headed by a volunteer leader who is chosen by his 
fellow members. The leader is usually a long-time member of 
the national party, TANU. By doing this, Tanzania has 
strengthened relations between formal and informal controls. 
Critical Issues Involved in Innovations 
It is important to explore not only what has occurred in 
the criminal justice innovations in Alaska and the new states 
of Africa outh of the Sahara, but also to examine why many 
of these innovations have not yielded the intended results. 
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Though there are numerous reasons, we will cite six of the 
most prominent ones here. They are: (1) inadequate diagnoses
of problems; (2) inadequate planning; (3) lack of resolve to 
anticipate implementation problems; (4) uncritical acceptance 
of innovations; (5) absence of monitoring and feedback 
mechanisms; and (6) skewedness of reform efforts. 
1. Inadequate Diagnoses of Problems
As would be expected 
in the processes of innovation, a number of problems were 
identified; however, their solutions were offered without 
thorough diagnoses. Often, solutions offered were off-target 
in that they represented organizational responses to problems 
which had been superficially defined and poorly analyzed under 
the pressures of time and, perhaps, political expediency. 
Training of police cadet officers began to mushroom, par­
ticularly in Uganda and Nigeria, where little had been established 
by colonial police policy makers and administrators. 
2. Inadequate Planning
From the inadequate diagnoses 
there naturally flowed inadequate planning. Ministries of the 
interior or justice or criminal justice planning agencies 
generally dealt with large-scale change efforts in an essentially 
ad hoc fashion. Their goals were usually fuzzy and incapable of 
being operationally defined. Policy makers failed to draw 
short-, intermediate- or long-range goals for their resolves 
and, thus, could not delineate strategies for implementing 
them. Without these strategies, alternatives and revisions 
were likewise impossible. 
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3. Lack of Resolve to Anticipate Implementation Problems
Missing from what planning was done was the recognition of the 
most critical phase--implementation--and all it would require. 
An assumption was made to the effect that once plans were 
drawn, the people would just naturally carry them out, financial 
requirements would be met, and facilities and equipment would 
appear. It was felt that should any resistance to change be 
encountered (and none was really expected, in spite of the 
knowledge that change is always resisted in some fashion) , 
administrators had only to replace staff members who could not 
be expected to devote themselves wholly to the effort called 
for by the plans. 
4. Uncritical Acceptance of Innovations
From the above attitude 
there resulted uncritical acceptance of innovations. 
From the four corners of the globe came ideas and suggestions, 
and apparently caution was thrown to the wind as resources were 
allocated for an assortment of relatively untested, ill-defined 
and poorly designed innovations which came devoid of operational 
procedures or guidelines. Little had been done in the way of 
pre-testing or pilot programming. In some cases in the new 
states of Africa South of the Sahara, for example, policy 
makers and administrators introduced changes which they them­
selves did not fully understand simply because they had been 
informed that such programs had "worked" overseas. 
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5. Absence of Monitoring and Feedback Mechanisms
The lack of rronitoring and feedback rrechanisms eliminated the 
ability to deal with problems promptly so as to allow criminal 
justice change processes to proceed in an orderly manner and 
with a sense of direction toward its aims and objectives. 
Through monitoring and feedback, mistakes, areas of stress and 
frustration, and causes for delays can be identified and 
alternative routes can be developed. 
6. Skewedness of Reform Efforts
Most revolutionary and reformist movements in history 
have been led by members of privileged classes who "jumped 
class lines.11
36 
The same has been true in Alaska as well as
in the new states of Africa south of the Sahara. A look at 
the list of participants in the Alaska Corrections Master Plan, 
or Somalia's legal team, or even Tanzania's socialist approach, 
for examples, reveals that the dominant figures were politicians, 
professors, researchers and practitioners rather than clients, 
practitioners, and representatives of the village com-
muni ties. This happened withstanding the fact that, unlike 
the peasants in the new states of Africa South of the Sahara, 
by virtue of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 19 71,37
there were Native corporations. Thus, the forces working 
toward change in Alaska came, for the most part, from outside 
consumers of justice. In fact, there appears to have been 
deliberate reluctance to involve staff, community leaders 
and clients in the deliberations concerning various innovations 
or proposed changes. In Malawi, for example, the legal 
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establishment objected to the retribalization of the legal 
38 39 
system. Also, Allott points out, in several African
countries, such as Ethiopia and Ivory Coast, unification has 
worked mainly by suppressing what is most "African" in the 
laws, and its replacement by received laws. 
What we have been confronted with, then, in Alaska and 
in many of these new states of Africa South of the Sahara is 
a cult of contemporaneity. We hear constantly of a generation 
gap. People are being driven apart by an ugly process of 
polarization which demands a choice between the past and the 
present. "That is backward " was an early slogan of the cult. 
The test of validity is relevance, and only the contemporary 
is relevant. 
As any good student of psychology can tell you, lack of 
involvement leads to resistance to changes. In other words, 
for movement toward authentic legal reform there is need not 
only for experts in "justice," but also experts who can 
evaluate socioeconomic efforts of legal reform on various 
segments of the population. 
Faced with the above mentioned and related issues, the 
average African peasant or Native Alaskan has taken to what he 
or she is used to in dispute settlement. For example, in 
Africa South of the Sahara Canter noted that one of the four 
reasons for a Zambian headman's rejecting a case in the village 
moot is either that it involves close relations between 
disputants who have had a long history of conflict or that it 




Also found are tactics invented by local people to increase 
the possibilities for equity. 
41
Many years ago, R. F. Barton 
described a system of fines among the Ifugao of the Philippines 
which was organized according to the ability of each class to 
pay. The Zapoteo required the powerful to be more responsible 
than the powerless , thus penalizing the rich who stole more 
severely than did the poor. Nader noted that weaker parties 
find avenues of redress which may be perceived as competitive 
with the disputing mechanisms controlled by the dominant parties.
42
In the Ghanian town of Koforidua, it has been found that there 
are varieties of access that people have, ranging from courts 
43
to supernatural processes. 
In the case of Alaskan villages, Angell recently alluded to 
the extent to which the Natives do their own thing in dispute 
settlements. He writes: "With exception of state enforcement 
agencies, over 30 % of the village officials interviewed 
indicated the level of state justice services are either 
inadequate or not provided to their villages . 11
4 4
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought not only to describe the general 
features of legal institutions and traditions which may be 
,. 
found in both Alaska and the new states of Africa South of the Sahara, but also 
to see what we can glean from a panoramic view. In the first 
case, beyond the misconceptions, stereotypes or bad 
imagery traditionally associated with both Alaska and Africa 
South of the Sahara, we find a rich reservoir of differences 
and similarities, as reflected in the efforts to bring about 
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meaningful criminal justi ce reform, as in much of everything 
else . In the second case, the challenge to Alaskan as well 
as African legislators, the judiciary and advocates of criminal 
justice integration is to promote the evolution of unified 
and effective modern criminal justice systems which, while 
serving economic and social needs of the people, will retain 
those vital elements of both customary and "received" laws 
which are part of their heritage. Such systems, which need 
not exclude patterns of principles of law · from other sources 
which are felt. to be appropriate , will above all be expanded and 
molded by original responses in these countries to the new 
.situation and problems which they face . .  
Legal history has, of course, known plenty of parallels 
to the current Alaskan and African situations, and it is full 
of the fictions and strategies that adjustments have rendered 
necessary. If the role of customary law/Islamic law is not 
to suffer under this strain, we should take steps to prepare 
for it . 
-25 -
REFERENCES 
1 . This expression is used to exclude the Mediterranean
belt which has felt strong influences from Europe and the Arab 
world and the Republic of South Africa where the man is deeply 
entrenched. 
2 . For example, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Tanzania (former­
ly Tanganyika) , Ghana (formerly Gold Coast) and Zambia (former­
ly Northern Rhodesia) came under their rule. Chad, Niger, Ivory 
Coast, Senegal and part of Cameroon ; for example , came under 
French rule. Zaire (formerly Belgium Congo) came under the 
Belgians. Mozambique and Angola are classic Portuguese 
colonies. Somaliland was shared between the British, Italians 
and the French, and Liberia was founded by former American 
slaves . 
3 . E. Ehrlich, The Fundamental Principles of the Sociology
of Law (Cambridge, MA, 1936) . 
4 . Ibid.






11. K. Oberg, The Social Economy of the Tlingit Indians
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973) , p. 10. 
12. Ibid.
-26-
13. M. M. Green, Ibgo Village Affairs. 2nd ed. (London,
1964), p. 113.
14. E. Cerullil, "Somalia, " vol. 1, A. F. I. S. Mogadiscio,
1957. 
15. J. Roscoe, The Baganda (London : MacMillan, 1911) .
16. NAI, CSO 1/3, Vl, MacGregor to Colonial Office,
22 March 1903. 
17. Ibid.
18. L. A. Fallers, Law Without Precedent (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press , 1960), p. 313. 
19. W. Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and
Constitutional History (Oxford , 1966) , p .  74 . 
20. Ibid .
21. T. N. Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian State:
The Southern Phase, 1898-1914 (London, 1972) , p. 35. 
22 . Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa 
(London: Routledge, 1959) , p. 22. 
23. Ibid, pp. 22-25.
24. See M. Gluckman, The Judicial Process Among the
Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (Manchester: University Press 
for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1955) . 
25. T. O .  Elias, Groundwork of Nigerian Law (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954). 
26 . Ibid. 
-27-
27. Ibid.
28. Quoted in T. W. Walbank, Contemporary Africa ;
Continent in Transition ( Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1956), 
pp. �3-94 . 
29 . H. N. Michael, Lieutenant Zagoskin ' s  Travels in 
Russian America, 1842-1844: The First Ethnographic and 
Geographic Investigations in the Yukon and Kuskokwim Valleys 
of Alaska . Arctic Institute of North America, Anthropology 
of the North; Translations from Russian Sources No. 7 ( Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1967) , p .  285. 
30. M. · E .  Price et al . ,  Native American Law Manual
(California Indian Legal Services, 19 70) , p .  1 .  
31. E. Gruening, The State of Alaska (New York : Random
House, 1954) . 
32. E .  0 .  Wright, The Politics of Punishment (New York :
Harper Torchbooks, 19 72). 
33. President ' s  Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, whose voluminous reports were 
published in 1967 . 
34. Alaska Corrections Master Plan : Executive Summary
(Juneau: Criminal Justice Planning Agency, 19 79) , p. 1. 
35. P. Contini, " Integration of Legal Systems in the
Somali Republic, " in Integration of Customary and Modern 
Legal Systems. Institute of African Studies (University 
of Ife Press, 19 7 1). 
-28-
36. Marx Engels, 19 72 , vol. 4 ,  pp . 471. See D. Apter ,
19 7 1 ,  p. 65. 
37. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act contains ,
among other things , three basic elements : ( 1 )  entitlement 
of land to Alaska Natives; (2 ) money paid to Alaska Natives 
for the extinguishment of claims to lands taken ; and (3) 
mechanisms determing how and to whom entitlements and monies 
shall be granted. 
38. C. Legum , African Contemporary Record ,  vol. 5 ,
19 72/73 (London, 1973) , p. Bl41. 
39. A. N. Allott ,  Judicial and Legal Systems in Africa
(London: Butterworths , 1962 ) . 
40. R .  S .  Canter , "Dispute Settlement and Dispute
Processing in Zambia: Individual Choice Versus Societal 
Restraints , "  in The Disputing Process--Law in Ten Societies , 
eds. , L. Nader and H .  F .  Todd (New York: Colwnbia U. Press , 19 78) . 
4 1. R. F. Barton , "Ifugao Law , "  University of California 
Publications in American Archaelogy and Ethnology , vol. 15 , 
no. 1 ,  1919 , reprinted 1969 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press ) , pp. 1-186. 
42 . L. Nader , "Styles of Court Procedure: To Make the 
Balance , "  in " The Ethnology of Law: A Bibliographic Survey , "
eds. , L. Nader , K. F. Koch, and B. Cos , Current Anthropology 
7 (March 1969 ) : 267 -294. 
43. M. Lowy, The Ethnography of Law in a Changing Ghanian
Town , Ph. D. dissertation , University of California , Berkeley , 1971. 
-29-
44. J .  Angell, Alaskan Village Justice: An Exploratory
Study (Anchorage, AK : Criminal Justice Center, 1979), p. 67. 
- 30-
